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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-MUNICIPALITY ZONED
EXCLUSIVELY FOR SINGLE-FAMILY DWELLINGS PROMOTES VALID COM-
MUNITY OBJECTIVES AND DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH RIGHT To
TRAEL.-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).
Edwin and Judith Dickman own a house in the Village of Belle
Terre, located on Long Island, New York, approximately eight miles
from the State University of New York at Stony Brook.' Zoned ex-
clusively for single-family dwellings, Belle Terre encompasses less than
a square mile and is inhabited by about 700 people living in 220
homes. 2 The Dickmans leased the house to student Michael Truman
for a term of eighteen months; Truman was joined later by five other
students.' On June 8, 1972, the students were denied residents' beach
passes because they were considered "illegal residents"-they were not
a "family" within the meaning of Belle Terre's "one-family dwelling"
requirement. The word "family" is defined by the zoning ordinance
to mean:
one or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of
household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute
a family.4
1. The village is located on Long Island's north shore and is entirely surrounded
by the town of Brookhaven, which, according to the 1970 Federal Census, has a popula-
tion of 245,000. Belle Terre is immediately adjacent on the northeast to Port Jefferson,
a town of 5500 persons. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 34, § 1, at 33 (1973). Because people now are
willing to travel farther to their jobs, Belle Terre could be considered a suburb of New
York City.
2. Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art. If, § DT-1.0 (1971), provides
that the entire village will consist of one "A" residential district. The building lots
in Belle Terre are zoned for a minimum size of one acre and a height restriction of
three stories. The saturation population level is considered to be 1400. NASSAU-SUFFOLK
REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, ZONING: INVENTORY AND ANALYSIS 96 (1970).
3. Bruce Boraas, one of the other five students, became a colessee with Michael Tru-
man. Anne Parish paid for a month's rent with a check drawn on her account. These
three tenants joined the Dickmans as plaintiffs in the case. The group of six inhabitants
maintained a "house" checking account and set up a single housekeeping unit, each
member sharing household duties and expenses. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367
F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art. I, § D-1.35a (1971). Cf. 2
PENSACOLA, FLA., CODE § 164-2 (1968) (persons related by blood or marriage, or no
more than four unrelated persons); 2 TALLAHASSEE, FLA., CODE ch. 37, art. II, § 2.2(42)
(1957) (persons living as a Single housekeeping unit); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE § 29-3(18)
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On July 31, the Dickmans were served with an "Order to Remedy
Violations," which notified the owners and students that they would
become liable for violation of the zoning ordinance on August 3,
unless the illegal condition was corrected by that time.5 On August
2, 1972, plaintiffs commenced suit6 seeking an injunction against en-
forcement of the ordinance and a declaration that the restriction against
occupancy by more than two unrelated persons was unconstitutional.!
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld
the ordinance, finding that the community's affirmative interest in
protecting the traditional family can be a "proper zoning considera-
tion."" The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the ordinance did
not have any rational connection with permissible zoning objectives. 9
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second
Circuit, holding that, since the ordinance is reasonable, not arbitrary
and bears "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective," it
is constitutional. 10
This comment will explore two issues: the effect Belle Terre is likely
to have on (a) a challenge to land use regulations based upon the
(1960) (persons related by blood, marriage or adoption maintaining a single housekeeping
unit).
Gainesville's definition may be unconstitutional. One of appellees' allegations was
that Belle Terre's definition of "family" violated their right of association, in that the
ordinance "reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live together." 94 S. Ct.
at 1541. The Court found no evidence of this. It was able to distinguish United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), where the Court held invalid a federal
law which excluded from participation in the food stamp program any household con-
taining an individual unrelated to any other household member. The Court, based
on this distinction, may be willing to invalidate a definition of "family" that requires
all members of a household to be related. If this is the case, the ordinances of Gaines.
ville and other localities, under which all members of the housekeeping unit must
be related by blood, marriage or adoption, may be vulnerable to a constitutional attack.
5. The ordinance provides that failure to correct an illegal condition within 48
hours after receiving notice to remedy constitutes a violation. Boraas v. Village of Belle
Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
6. The suit was brought against the Mayor and Trustees of Belle Terre under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Jurisdiction was grounded on
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343, 2201 (1970). Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806,
809-10 (2d Cir. 1973); see note 3 supra.
7. The ordinance was alleged to violate, among others, the right to travel, the
right to privacy and the right to migrate to and settle within a state. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1538, 1540 (1974).
8. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
9. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973).
10. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974), quoting from Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The permissible state objectives that the Court found
were "to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id. at 1541.
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right to travel and (b) the limits of governmental authority with re-
gard to zoning and land use planning.
A. Land Use Regulations and the Right To Travel
Recently it has been argued" that land use regulations may violate
an individual's constitutional right to travel,'12 since such regulations
may preclude persons from migrating to and settling in certain areas
of a state. One argument raised by the Belle Terre appellees was that
the restrictive zoning ordinance at issue impinged upon that constitu-
tional right.'3 The Court rejected this argument with the observation
that the ordinance was "not aimed at transients."'1
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in Crandall v. Nevada.'5 In that
case the Court invalidated a special state tax levied on railroads and
stage companies for every passenger carried out of the state. 16 In Shapiro
v. Thompson 7 this right to travel doctrine was expanded to encompass
the freedom to migrate to and settle in any state of a person's choice.-
11. See Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing
Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 635 (1971); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitu-
tional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972).
12. A detailed history and analysis of the right to travel is beyond the scope of this
comment. It is, however, necessary to consider the doctrine briefly so that Belle Terre's
influence may be properly appreciated. For an indepth study of the right to travel see
Boudin, The Constitutional Right To Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956); Comment,
The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?,
39 U. CHi. L. REV. 612 (1972).
13. 94 S. Ct at 1540.
14. Id.
15. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). This was the first majority opinion to recognize
the right, although it had been recognized in the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Taney in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 491-92 (1849). The first recogni-
tion of the right by a lower court had occurred in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
551-52 (No. 3230) (E.D. Pa. 1823). The right may be traced to chapter 42 of the Magna
Carta, which gave every free man the right to leave England, except in wartime. See
Boudin, The Constitutional Right To Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
Other cases recognizing the right to travel from state to state include Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
16. Cf. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972), in which the Court allowed the airport authority to charge emplaning
passengers a fair approximation of the cost of the facilities used.
17. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro the Supreme Court invalidated state welfare
provisions that denied assistance to persons meeting all eligibility qualifications except
for a one year residency requirement. See also Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807
(1st Cir. 1970).
18. Shapiro has since been followed in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237, 285 (1970) (concurring opinions).
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The test formulated in Shapiro did not completely preclude regulation
of travel. Rather, a regulation impeding the right to travel could be
upheld if it promoted a "compelling state interest." 19 The Court left
open the question of what factual basis was necessary to show that the
right to travel had been impinged.2 0
In the case of Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County21 the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the application of the compelling state
interest test to legislation challenged as infringing the right to travel.
The Court formulated a two-fold analysis that considered: (1) whether
the regulation allegedly impinging upon the right to travel would
deter migration12 and (2) the extent to which the regulation would
penalize the exercise of the right to travel.23 Thus, restrictions on the
right to travel are not per se unconstitutional;2 4 to be invalid they
must deter migration and penalize the individual for exercising that
right.
Applying the Maricopa analysis to the Belle Terre factual setting,
it appears that the Belle Terre zoning ordinance should have been in-
validated. It seems unquestionable that by allowing only single-family
dwellings the village will deter the migration of tenants such as the
Belle Terre appellees, since their residence there as a group would be
illegal under the zoning ordinance. Secondly, groups of tenants
attempting to migrate to and settle in Belle Terre will be penalized in
two ways: (1) if they comply with the ordinance their right of associa-
tion will be limited by the village's definition of "family" 25 and (2)
if more than two unrelated tenants move into a single-family dwelling
In an earlier case, it was implied that a right to migrate to and settle in another
state could be found in the Crandall right to travel doctrine. See Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915).
19. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
20. The lower courts have found this aspect of the test perplexing. See Cole v.
Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). Some lower courts have stricken laws
that merely touch on the right to travel. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Others have required a more serious
interference. See, e.g., Richardson v. Graham, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970), afj'd, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Hall v. King, 266 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1972).
21. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In Maricopa the Supreme Court relied on the right to
travel doctrine to invalidate an Arizona statute that required an indigent to have
resided in a county for one year before he could receive nonemergency hospital care
at county expense.
22. Id. at 257.
23. Id.
24. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 n.21 (1969).
25. The village ordinance definition of "family" restricted to two the number




in the village they will be subject to criminal prosecution for violation
of the zoning ordinance. The Court, however, rejected appellees' right
to travel argument, stating that the zoning ordinance is "not aimed at
transients." 26 Apparently the Court has added a third element to the
right to travel analysis articulated in Maricopa. Before a statute will
be invalidated because it impedes the right to travel it now must be
"aimed at transients." By reading the right to travel doctrine so nar-
rowly, the Court seems to have intimated an intent to nullify only
simple-minded, clumsy attempts to curtail individuals' ability to
migrate to a certain area.2 7 Unfortunately, legislation not specifically
"aimed at transients" may have a significant impact on one's freedom
to travel. 28
26. 94 S. Ct. at 1540.
27. Compare the attitude of the Belle Terre Court, see 94 S. Ct. at 1540, with the
attitude expressed in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), where the Court stood ready
to "nullify sophisticated as well as simple-minded" discriminatory schemes. Id. at 275.
The impact of Belle Terre on the right to travel doctrine as applied to land use
planning may be limited by the unique factual setting of the case. As previously men-
tioned, although Belle Terre was zoned entirely for single-family dwellings, the village
land mass was less than one square mile. Since the neighboring communities offered
land uses that would have permitted the students to live together as a family, it would
have been but a short trip for the Belle Terre tenants to secure other accommodations.
If, however, Belle Terre were twenty or so miles square, or if all communities in the
Belle Terre area were zoned for single-family dwellings, the Court might have been more
likely to find a violation of the right to travel. Such a result was suggested in the trial
court opinion by judge Dooling. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 144-49
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Dickmans and the student-tenants had argued that if the Belle
Terre ordinance were valid, every other community could adopt a similar ordinance to
prevent groups such as the student-tenants from residing in one-family dwelling districts.
Judge Dooling acknowledged this possibility, but felt that the likelihood of such future
community action was not a relevant factor in deciding the case before him:
There is no present threat that exclusion from Belle Terre would deny to the
plaintiff students the right to live as the group that they are. It may be that, as
plaintiffs suggest, other villages, and the Town of Brookhaven, might move in
the direction of adopting such a definition of family as Belle Terre has adopted.
Should that occur then plainly the facts will have changed and a different case
will have been presented than is now presented.
Id. at 147-48.
28. The recent decision in Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F.
Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), decided about one month after the Supreme Court's decision
in Belle Terre, suggests that dismissal of a litigant's right to travel argument against
land use regulations may not be automatic. In Petaluma the court held in violation of
the right to travel a plan adopted to limit the number of housing starts within the
city, and thereby to limit the population growth of the city. The court found that the
city had a carrying capacity for significantly more persons than currently resided within
its boundaries, and decided that if Petaluma were allowed to limit its population by
limiting the number of housing starts, other communities would have to provide not
only for the area's natural population growth but also for the excess population that
otherwise would have settled in Petaluma. Compare 375 F. Supp. at 587 with Boraas
v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Petaluma court
framed the issue as whether "a municipality capable of supporting a natural population
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If Belle Terre is not limited to its facts, and if the Court did intend
to circumscribe the right to travel principle, the decision may have
far-reaching implications. For example, Belle Terre might breathe
new life into the controversial concept of imposing a tax on new resi-
dents of Florida 2 9 as a means of discouraging migration into the state.
While a direct impact fee probably would be unconstitutional,0 tax
lawyers should be able to devise a levy sufficiently indirect to pass
constitutional muster under Belle Terre. If such a tax were not con-
strued to be "aimed at transients" it might be upheld; evidently, the
fact that such a tax might penalize new residents would no longer
dictate its nullification.
B. Land Use Regulations and the Limits of Governmental Power
Only rarely does the Supreme Court agree to hear a zoning case.
Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,81 which was heard in
1926, the Court had decided only five zoning cases prior to Belle
Terre.3 2 The power of governments to zone land has not been in dis-
expansion [may] limit growth simply because it does not prefer to grow at the rate
which would be dictated by prevailing market demand." 375 F. Supp. at 583. The
court answered this question in the negative, not taking notice of the sweeping language
in Belle Terre that allows preservation of community values to be a valid zoning ob-
jective. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
The Petaluma court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre,
arguing that the latter involved a "zoning regulation which prohibited groups of un-
married persons from living together in the village," whereas the Petaluma plan had
as its "very reason for being" the exclusion of persons from the city and the abridgement
of their right to travel. 375 F. Supp. at 584 n.l. But "virtually all zoning schemes limit
the manner in which people move about in one way or another." Id. at 583. The question
is where to draw the line. The Petaluma court suggests that historically acceptable
land use planning techniques, such as zoning regulations, will not be subject to a right
to travel challenge, but that more revolutionary land use planning techniques, such as
a housing-start cap, will be vulnerable to such an attack.
29. A bill entitled "Florida Impact Fee Law," Fla. H.R. 2705-SF (Comm. Substitute
1974), which would have allowed placement of fees on all new construction was con-
sidered in the 1974 session of the Florida Legislature. See FLA. H.R. Jout. 1025 (1974).
The bill died in the House Committee on Community Affairs. See LEGISLATME INFORMA-
TION DrvisIoN, JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMImTEE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1974
REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, History of House Bills 223 (undated).
30. Such a tax would most certainly be "aimed at transients." Moreover it would
clearly act to deter migration, because a person would be hesitant to incur the expense
of moving into Florida, and it would penalize those persons who had recently moved
in interstate travel. A state may not restrain "the transportation of persons and prop-
erty across its borders." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941). Cf. Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
31. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Washington ex tel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274
U.S. 325 (1927). Cf. Berman v, Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which was a "taking" case.
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pute since Euclid: at issue ever since has been the scope of this power.
When do land use regulations cease to regulate, and instead become a
"taking" requiring compensation under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments?"3  While lower courts have grappled with this problem, 4 the
Supreme Court has not recently reviewed the issue. Belle Terre, the
first land use case before the Supreme Court in twelve years, offers
some insight into this continuing controversy.
The power to enact zoning ordinances has been construed as a
necessary element of the police power of the state. 35 In order to pass
constitutional muster a zoning ordinance must bear a "substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
' '3 If
an ordinance fails to meet this test, it may be found an unnecessary
and unreasonable restriction on private property.3 7 The courts, how-
ever, will not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature when
it is "fairly debatable" whether the zoning ordinance is an unreason-
able exercise of the police power. 38 Historically, therefore, considerable
deference has been accorded to legislative zoning determinations.
In Euclid the Court delineated examples of the valid exercise of
the police power to enhance the general welfare through zoning: "to
minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of over-crowding,
and the like, and [to exclude] from residential sections offensive trades,
industries and structures likely to create nuisances."3 9 Most state courts,
however, have adopted a broad interpretation of the "public welfare,"
and have not limited zoning regulations and the police power to such
obvious examples.4 0 Florida courts have accepted this broad interpreta-
33. For a detailed analysis and criticism of the law in this area see F. BOsSELMAN,
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
34. See, e.g., Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal.
1970), afl'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me.
1973); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
35. 272 U.S. at 387.
36. Id. at 395.
37. See, e.g., State ex tel. Tampa Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, North Unit, Inc. v.
City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1950); Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs, 11 A.2d 304
(N.J. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 15 A.2d 598 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1940). See also 10A G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 5355-57 (1957).
38. See, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 US. 325 (1927); City of Miami
Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied sub nom. Wags Transp. Sys., Inc. v.
Prevatt, 355 U.S. 957 (1958); Morgan v. City of Chicago, 18 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. 1938).
39. 272 U.S. at 388.
40. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (upholding mandatory dedication); Golden v. Planning Bd., 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) (upholding developmental timing ordinance); Reid
v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963) (upholding requirement of
board certification of plan); State ex tel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969) (up-
holding public rights to beach land); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972) (upholding shoreline regulation that includes wetlands protection).
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tion for quite some time,41 and in Belle Terre it was approved by the
Supreme Court.42
The Supreme Court already had accepted a broad reading of "public
welfare" in relation to eminent domain proceedings. 43 In Berman v.
Parker the Court sanctioned an urban redevelopment project in the
District of Columbia that had required condemnation of private prop-
erty in order to "develop a better balanced, more attractive com-
munity.' '44 The Court stated:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not de-
limit it....
... The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive....
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.45
The Belle Terre Court based its decision in large measure on Ber-
man v. Parker.46 It is arguable, however, that this reliance was mis-
placed: the limit of police power and the limit of the power to take
under eminent domain are not one and the same.4 7 Just compensation
is required where a taking occurs, while no compensation is afforded
when a land owner is only precluded from using his property in a
41. See City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1969) (consideration of
future growth and development, adequacy of drainage and storm sewers, public streets,
pedestrian walkways, and density of population); City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71
So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953) (to protect the public's right of access to the beaches, to promote
the economic welfare of the city, and to properly time hotel and apartment develop-
ment); City of Miami v. Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
201 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1967) (to promote integrity of neighborhood and preserve residential
character).
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1539.
43. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
44. Id. at 31; see id. at 33. The property was not being taken for a traditional "public
use," since it was not to be used for a highway or a park; rather it was to be re-
developed as part of a planned community by private developers. One issue was whether
such a project, which was for the "benefit of the public," came within the fifth
amendment limitation that private property be taken only for a "public use." The
Court upheld the act, equating "benefit of the public" with "public use." Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 32-33.
46. See 94 S. Ct. at 1539.
47. See Smith v. State Highway Comm'n, 346 P.2d 259, 267-68 (Kan. 1959). See also
5A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2575 (1957);
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
[Vol. 2
CASE COMMENTS
certain way.48 As a matter of policy, courts should allow a taking in
cases where they might not allow regulation. Since the owner suffering
a taking is compensated for his troubles, he is, therefore, somewhat
better off than the landowner who merely loses the opportunity to use
his property in a particular manner because of governmental restric-
tions. In spite of this distinction, Belle Terre treats the two powers
as though they were one and applies to zoning regulations the broad
public benefit standard adopted in Berman.49
By failing to draw any distinction between different governmental
actions affecting land use, the Belle Terre Court's analysis appears to
sanction indiscriminately many types of restrictive land use controls-
some good, some bad. The Court noted that passage of comprehensive
statewide land use statutes, such as the one enacted by the Vermont
legislature,M, probably would be upheld as valid efforts to protect the
general welfare. 51 In addition to suggesting approval of such statutes,
the Court's analysis seems to condone the adoption of exclusionary
zoning ordinances-a minimum lot size for the erection of a dwelling, 52
control of developmental pace and sequence 5 s a minimum floor area
for a dwelling,5 4 exclusion of all multiple-family dwellings from a
48. There is a limit to which use can be restricted without becoming a "taking."
See Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938). If that limit is
exceeded, compensation must be paid. See Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50 (Md. 1925).
49. Indeed, the Court cites Berman for the proposition that it "refused to limit
the concept of public welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations." 94 S. Ct. at
1539. It is questionable whether a strict reading of Berman would require this result.
Berman was not a challenge to any zoning regulation; use of the property at issue con-
formed with the applicable zoning regulations. See Record at 2, Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
50. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 151 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
51. 94 S. Ct. at 1539 n.3. The Court noted the Vermont statute as an example of
an enhancement of the public welfare through zoning regulation. Id. A similar compre-
hensive planning act proposed for Florida by the Environmental Land Management
Study (ELMS) Committee was passed by the Florida House of Representatives during
the 1974 session, but died on the Senate calendar. See Fla. H.R. 2884 (Comm. Substitute
1974); LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION DIVISION, JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE,
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1974 REGULAR SEssIoN FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, History of House
Bills 259 (undated).
52. Cf. Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1942) (upholding one-
acre minimum lot size); Fischer v. Bedminster, 93 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1952) (upholding
five-acre requirement for construction of residences). But see Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970) (holding invalid two-acre requirement for lots along
existing roads and three-acre requirement for interior lots); Board of County Super-
visors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390 (Va. 1959) (holding invalid two-acre lot requirement).
53. Cf. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) (upholding
developmental timing ordinance). See generally Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo
Pass a Law To Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 234 (1973).
But cf. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (holding invalid a plan to limit the number of housing starts within the city).
54. Cf. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 89 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1952), appeal
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municipality,5 5 and adoption of a restrictive definition of "family. ' '5
The Belle Terre Court recognized that the latter device is a permissible
exercise of the police power to enhance the general welfare-"
The Court mentioned only in passing that Belle Terre is zoned
solely for single-family residences. The Court apparently intended to
sanction sub silentio the power of municipalities to exclude multi-
family dwellings. A majority of court decisions, in Florida58 and else-
where,59 have upheld the power of municipalities to allow only single-
family residences within their boundaries. While many courts have
approved a municipality's power to zone itself exclusively residential,
most have stressed the nature of the geographic area and the nature
of the town within that area in upholding the ordinance against con-
stitutional attack.60 These courts have looked to determine whether
the needs of the people of the town were satisfied by the other areas
of the region.61 Very few courts have asked the logical corollary to
this question; that is, whether the exclusionary zoning of a single
municipality should be prevented when regional needs are not
promoted by that zoning.62
dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). But cf. Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118 (Pa. 1954)
(holding invalid minimum floor area requirement of 1800 square feet).
55. But cf. Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970) (holding unconstitutional
the failure of township's zoning scheme to provide for multiple-family dwellings).
56. Cf. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding
for purposes of single-family residence zones a definition of "family" that limited to
four the number of unrelated persons living together as a single housekeeping unit).
57. 94 S. Ct. at 1536.
58. See, e.g., Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
59. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Cadoux v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 294 A.2d 582 (Conn.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
924 (1972); City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 230 S.W.2d 902 (Ky.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
945 (1950).
60. See cases cited in notes 58 & 59 supra. The Belle Terre Court did not stress this
element.
61. See Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955), where
the court said:
It would appear contrary to the very purposes of municipal planning to require
a village such as Valley View to designate some of its area for business or in-
dustrial purposes without regard to the public need for business or industrial
uses. The council of such a village should not be required to shut its eyes to
the pattern of community life beyond the borders of the village itself. We think
that it is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable for a residential village to pass
an ordinance preserving its residential character, so long as the business and in-
dustrial needs of its inhabitants are supplied by other accessible areas in the
community at large.
(Emphasis added.) See also Comment, The Validity of Zoning an Entire Municipality
Exclusively Residential, 1974 URBAN L. ANNUAL 304.
62. See generally Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution To
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There are two reasons why the latter question is appropriate. First,
subdivisions of a state are granted the power to zone either by a state
enabling act or by the state constitution. 3 If a court looks to whether
the housing needs of individuals are provided for in other communities
in the region in order to determine whether a local government
properly may prohibit multi-family dwellings, it is basing the power
to zone on what a community's neighbors have done and not on the
state enabling act. In such a situation the first town to zone solely for
single-family residences has the power to do so, while the third or
fourth town attempting similar regulation does not-even though all
towns are acting pursuant to the same enabling act. Obviously this is
not a desirable result.
A second argument against basing zoning decisions on the needs
of a particular municipality, instead of the wider region, raises a public
policy issue.64 Zoning decisions always have been required in some
manner to comport with a comprehensive plan.6 5 But why should a
comprehensive plan extend only to the artificial municipal boundaries
that in many cases were promulgated years ago under completely
different conditions? A few enabling acts require local government
to consider the welfare of the region or of the state in formulating
zoning regulations.6 Florida does not have a zoning enabling act, 7
so the public policy of this state must be gleaned from other statutes. 68
By passing the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management
Act of 1972, ' the legislature has suggested that public policy requires
local governments to consider regional needs when exclusionary zoning
ordinances having an extraterritorial effect are proposed. The Act
requires a local zoning commission to consider the regional impact of
any large development that is of a type designated as a "development
Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REv. 244 (1971); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond
Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 118-21.
63. Florida's zoning enabling act, Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19539, was included
in FLA. STAT. ch. 176 (1971). Repeal of the law, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129, § 5, was
a recognition of municipalities' constitutional powers under the FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII,
§ 2(b); it was not meant to restrict this power, but left the exercise of the zoning power
to the discretion of the local government.
64. See Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 206 A.2d 678, 687 (Md. 1965); Borough of
Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954).
65. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 9 (3d ed.
1972); Note, Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the Consistency Requirement, 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 766 (1974).
66. COLO. RLv. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-14 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-13 (1953).
67. See note 63 supra.
68. See Davis v. Strine, 191 So. 451, 452 (Fla. 1939), where Chief Justice Terrell
stated that "[p]ublic policy or what constitutes public policy is a matter of legislative
determination."
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1973).
1974]
798 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of regional impact." 70 If zoning commissions must consider the regional
impact of such developments, it would seem appropriate for Florida
courts to consider the extraterritorial impact of exclusionary zoning
ordinances whenever the question arises. Further evidence exists to
suggest that this is indeed the public policy of Florida. The legislature
has authorized the establishment of regional planning councils to aid
local governments in regional, metropolitan, county and municipal
planning matters.71 The legislature has also authorized the establish-
ment of regional transportation systems and facilities. 72 Because of
this public policy, Florida courts should consider the needs of the
region when reviewing exclusionary zoning ordinances that have a
substantial extraterritorial effect, even though the Belle Terre Court
apparently did not consider this aspect of the question.
Americans increasingly have voiced concern about the quality of
the environment. The Supreme Court is sensitive to such public senti-
ment and has mirrored this concern in Belle Terre. The Court has
refused to limit the scope of the government's power to regulate the
use of land; rather it has suggested that broad land use and planning
statutes, such as that enacted in Vermont73 and the proposed federal
legislation, 74 would be held constitutional if the question were before
the Court. While this environmental concern should be applauded, the
language of Belle Terre does not necessarily limit the decision's effect
to such noble ideals. The Court's decision appears to allow communi-
ties to adopt exclusionary zoning techniques as a method of limiting
population density without consideration of the impact of the zoning
ordinances on the entire region. While the Court might distinguish
Belle Terre from subsequent cases on the basis of the village's size
and rural setting, the facts belie such a distinction.75
In view of the Supreme Court's disinclination to consider zoning
cases7 6 Belle Terre may stand for quite some time as a guidepost in
this turbulent area of the law. But land use planning today is not what
it was only several years ago. Today there is an increasing demand for
70. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1973). See Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida En-
vironmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973 URBAN L. ANNUAL 103, 125-33.
71. See FLA. STAT. §§ 160.01-.02 (1973).
72. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.565-72 (1973).
73. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 151 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
74. See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, LAND USE POLICY AND
PLANNING ASSISTANCE ACT, S. REP. No. 93-197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
75. See note I supra. This glossing over of facts is not new in zoning cases. In
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court ignored the
trial court's finding that the true purpose of the zoning ordinance was to segregate the
people of the community according to their wealth and station in life. See Ambler Realty
Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
76. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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curtailing growth, especially among small communities on the fringe
of urban sprawl, and for the development of comprehensive land use
planning to protect the environment. This interest suggests that the
courts will be called upon more frequently to consider the constitu-
tional questions raised by local ordinances designed to meet these
ends. Thus, while Belle Terre gives a green light to increased govern-
mental control of land use, it also extends the constitutionally ac-
ceptable boundary of zoning regulation. But the decision does not
delineate this boundary; that will have to await another case.
Federal Jurisdiction-WATER POLLUTION CONTROL-FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 REACH POLLUTING
ACTIVITIES OCCURRING ABOVE MEAN HIGH-WATER LINE.-United States
v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
Without a federal permit Langston Holland and his associates
were filling mangrove wetlands and man-made canals in preparation
for future development of a 281 acre tract known as Harbor Isle, ad-
joining Papy's Bayou on Tampa Bay.' The United States, through the
Environmental Protection Agency, alleged that this operation violated
both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19722
and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,3 and sought an order pro-
1. The Court detailed the inter-tidal nature of the area:
2. For the purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing the Court accepted
defendants' determination that the mean high water line is one foot above sea level.
3. Tide data, visual observation and classification of vegetation established that
a substantial number of tides exceed two feet above sea level.
(a) The United States Geological Survey tide gauge data indicated that 50-100
tides exceed two feet in the subject water each year.
4. The parties stipulated to the accuracy of a land survey introduced by de-
fendants....
(a) Most of the property is interlaced with artificial mosquito canals containing
water.
(b) The water in the mosquito canals is connected to Papy's Bayou.
(c) The elevation of much of the property is less than two feet.
6. Defendants would continue to discharge sand, dirt, dredged spoil and biological
materials until the fill created has effectively displaced tidal waters, thereby
eliminating the normal ebb and flow of tides over the subject property.
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 667 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
2. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1974).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970).
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